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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

MICHAEL C. MARTIN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20110056-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
On August 28, 2009, the trial court entered judgment against Appellant Michael
Martin for criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-106
(2003) and 76-3-402(1) (Supp. 2006). On December 17, 2010, the trial court reinstated
the time for filing an appeal, pursuant to Rule 4(f), Utah R. App. P. On January 7, 2011,
Martin filed his Notice of Appeal. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (Supp. 2010). The judgment and the order reinstating
the appeal are attached at Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that Martin violated the
conditions of the plea agreement.
Standard of Review: This Court will review the issue for an abuse of discretion.
See State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798? 804 (Utah 1990); State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989,
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991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A district court abuses its discretion when it fails to properly
consider relevant factors and when it misapplies the law. See State v. McCovey, 803
P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) ("An abuse of discretion results when the judge 'fails to
consider all legally relevant factors'" (note omitted)); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,
425 (Utah 1991) ("[T]rial courts do not have discretion to misapply the law").
Preservation: The issue was preserved in the record at 197:23, 56-59.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal and set forth at
Addendum B: Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-l to -4 (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: This matter began as a dispute between neighbors, and
resulted in charges against Martin for two counts of criminal mischief. In November
2004, the State filed an Information, charging count one as a second-degree felony and
count two as a third-degree felony. R.3-5. The State alleged that Martin tore down a
fence and cut a tree belonging to his neighbor, Kathryn Randazzo. Id. On December 22,
2004, the trial court ordered Martin to have "no contact with" Ms. Randazzo. R.9.
Course of the Proceedings: On September 29, 2005, the State and Martin
entered into an agreement to resolve the criminal case, R.51-58, where the State agreed to
dismiss count one (the second-degree felony), and Martin agreed to enter a no-contest
plea on count two (the third-degree felony). R.51. Also, the trial court agreed to hold the
plea on count two in abeyance for one year on the condition that "the defendant replace
the chain link fence and replant an elm tree that defendant removed[,] and replace the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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shrubs destroyed and to have the work done by a licensed third party." R.55, 60; see also
R.188:7, 10-13.
On July 28, 2006, less than ten months after entry of the plea-in-abeyance
agreement, the State filed papers for an order to show cause why Martin should not be
found in violation of the agreement. R. 108-110. On January 19, 2007, the trial court
held an evidentiary hearing and ruled that Martin was in violation. See R. 124-25. It
"revoked" the plea in abeyance and set the matter for sentencing. Id.
Disposition in the Court Below: On April 20, 2007, the court entered judgment
against Martin for two counts of criminal mischief, and it sentenced him to probation for
24 months. See R.131-33; 192:16-19. On May 8, 2007, the court issued a Memorandum
Decision to clarify and correct the judgment. See R. 136-39. Pursuant to the
Memorandum Decision, the trial court vacated count one - as the parties had intended
under the original terms of the plea agreement - and it entered a conviction for a class A
misdemeanor on count two. Id. In addition, the court set aside sentencing to assess
restitution. R.138-39.
On May 21, 2007, Martin initiated his first appeal by filing a notice. R.141. On
February 20, 2009, this Court denied the appeal stating that due to the trial court's
Memorandum Decision, there was no final order. Thus, the appeal was premature. See
State v. Martin, 2009 UT App 43,1J15, 204 P.3d 875. This Court returned the case to the
trial court, and on August 28, 2009, the court reinstated the judgment. See R.323-24. It
ordered Martin to serve a term of 365 days in jail, it suspended the jail term, it ordered
probation for 12 months, and it set the matter for a restitution hearing. Id.
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In November 2009 and February 2010, the court held restitution hearings and on
April 9, 2010, it entered an order for $8,650. R.340-44. On June 24, 2010, Martin
initiated an appeal for a second time. R.363. On August 26, 2010, this Court ruled that
the appeal was untimely: "Martin was sentenced on his no-contest plea on August 28,
2009, His notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days after entry of the sentence."
State v. Martin TIR Case No. 20100536; 2010 UT App 238. Also, the court noted that
Martin was not appealing the restitution order but attempting to "reach back to challenge
his conviction." IdL n.l. The Court recommended that Martin seek relief under Rule 4(f),
Utah R. App. P., if appropriate. Id n.2.
In September 2010, Martin filed for relief under Rule 4(f), among other things.
R.375-79. On December 17, 2010, the Court held an evidentiary hearing, R.448, and
Martin testified that after he was sentenced on August 28, 2009, he contacted his trial
attorney within the 30-day period to appeal from the sentence and judgment. R.448:1316. The attorney advised Martin to appeal after the trial court ruled on restitution.
R.448:15. Consequently, Martin did not appeal from the August 28 sentence.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that counsel's advice was
incorrect and it led to the failure to file a timely notice of appeal. Also on December 17,
2010, the court reinstated the time for filing the appeal. R.448:23-24; 443. On January 7,
2011, Martin filed a notice of appeal. It is timely. He is not incarcerated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As stated supra, this matter originally began as a dispute between neighbors. As a
result of the dispute, the State filed an Information against Martin for two counts of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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criminal mischief. R.3-5. It alleged that he tore down a fence in Ms. Randazzo's
backyard and cut down an elm tree. Id. Several months after the State filed the charges,
the parties entered into a plea agreement. R.51-58. The State agreed to dismiss count
one of the Information, and Martin agreed to enter a no-contest plea on count two. Id.
Also, the trial court agreed to hold the plea on count two in abeyance for one year on the
condition that "the defendant replace the chain link fence and replant an elm tree that
defendant removed[,] and replace the shrubs destroyed and to have the work done by a
licensed third party." R.55; see_alsoR. 188:7, 10-13.
On July 28, 2006, the State filed papers for an order to show cause why Martin
should not be found in violation of the plea-in-abeyance agreement. R. 108-110.
According to the papers, Martin violated the plea agreement by "entering the [neighbor's]
property and replacing the fence himself." R.109, ^|2. Also, the State alleged that Martin
failed to have a damaged tree stump removed from the property prior to restoring
landscape. Id., ^3. It claimed that Martin failed to have the work "completed by a
licensed, third party professional." IcL And it claimed that Martin failed to "replace the
foliage that was taken commensurate in value to the one destroyed." Id., ^4. According
to the papers, the original tree that was damaged "was a well established tree valued at
the time around $4,000.00. The defendant replaced the tree with a sapling valued at
approximately $25.00." Id,
On January 19, 2007, the court held an evidentiary hearing where Ms. Randazzo
discussed the fence, the tree and the foliage in her yard. R. 197:5-6. She acknowledged
that the fence had been replaced. R. 197:10. However, she claimed the posts were
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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uneven, the gate did not close properly, the fence bowed in the middle, and it was not on
her property line. R.197:10, 17-19, 24; but see R. 197:26. In addition, according to Ms.
Randazzo, she had not been contacted by a third-party licensed contractor to do any of
the replacement work. R.197:7, 10.
Ms. Randazzo acknowledged she had received a replacement tree. However, she
complained that the old tree stump had not been removed, and the original elm had not
been replaced with a mature tree of commensurate value. R. 197:7-9, 26. Instead, she
received a sapling valued at $29.97. R. 197:8-9. Also, Ms. Randazzo acknowledged
foliage and vines now, R. 197:27, where vines originally were destroyed. R. 197:19-20.
After Ms. Randazzo testified, the prosecutor called additional witnesses. He
called Stacey Poppleton, Ms. Randazzo's neighbor, to testify that she had seen Martin
"fiddling" with an end cap or finial on a corner post of the fence in the fall or winter of
the previous year. R. 197:32-33, 36. Also, the prosecutor presented evidence from
Joseph Johnson concerning the value of destroyed foliage. R. 197:40.
Martin then testified. He discussed the chain-link fence and foliage. He replaced
the fence and reinforced it with help from a third-party licensed electrician "slash
handyman," Evan Lee. R. 197:47, 48. Martin acknowledged that Lee and he did the
work together, he assisted when needed, and he was able to assist without trespassing on
Ms. Randazzo's property. R.197:49-50, 52-53. Martin explained the need for a licensed
electrician in installing a chain-linked fence. R.197:50, 52. Also, he acknowledged that
Lee was not present at all times throughout installation of the fence, but Lee did most of
the work and he was there "[t]he majority of the time." R.197:50, 55.
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With respect to the foliage, Martin identified vines on the property. See R. 197:4546; Defendant's Exhibits 2 & 3. And he testified that he purchased a tree as a
replacement for the elm, but did not know what to do with it. R. 197:53-54. He contacted
his attorney for advice and tried to communicate with the assistant district attorney but
received no information. Id. Martin testified that the tree was still available. R. 197:54.
After Martin testified, the trial court ruled as follows:
I think [Mr. Martin has] frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind, the work was
not done as ordered by a third-party.
At least what I've heard - and I'll let you address it if you want. One, I don't hear
anything to suggest he's violated the no contact order. Two, the shrubbery, no real
basis for finding that. Three, the tree, frankly, the order is ambiguous. If it wasn't
ambiguous, you wouldn't be offering that sapling as a replacement, that's certainly doesn't violate the letter; you've absolutely violated the spirit of the
agreement. And last, though, is the third-party agreement, that it be done by a
licensed third party. You know, one of the reasons was - that is, so we wouldn't
have this exact kind of issue. The fact is, color it however you want, he was out
there with a third-party doing the work, and not supervised by the third-party at all
times.
R. 197:55-56; see also id. at 197:57 (stating the order required that "all work be[] done by
a third-party, and you tell me he's just assisting, and somebody is looking over his
shoulder. It's not being done by him. And, frankly, he's admitting that he wasn't supervised at all times by the third-party"); ki at 197:59 ("My ruling as to the plea in abeyance
goes solely to not having all work done by a licensed third-party, period"). The court
then set the matter for sentencing. See R. 197:66. Martin's appeal challenges the trial
court's ruling as it relates to the alleged violations of the plea-in-abeyance agreement.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Martin and the State entered into an agreement, whereby Martin agreed to replace
a fence and foliage in his neighbor's yard, and he agreed to have the work done by a
licensed third party. Sometime after entering into the agreement, the State filed an order
to show cause, alleging that Martin was in violation of the agreement. Thereafter, the
trial court held a hearing on the matter.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Martin violated the
agreement because he assisted the third party in replacing the fence, and he was not
supervised by the third party at all times in doing the work. Martin does not dispute the
trial court's findings. Rather, he maintains that the plea-in-abeyance agreement did not
prohibit him from assisting with the work and it did not require that all work be done
totally, exclusively, and solely by the third party.
In addition, to the extent the trial court intended the plea agreement to be so
restrictive, it was required to ensure that when the parties entered into the agreement, it
contained such terms explicitly and unambiguously. Since the agreement failed to set out
those terms, the trial court could not later apply them against Martin for a violation.
Moreover, Martin was in substantial compliance with the terms and conditions of the
agreement.
Based on the record here, the trial court erred in ruling that Martin was in violation
of the agreement, and its error constituted an abuse of discretion. Martin respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court ruling and reinstate the agreement.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND MARTIN TO BE IN VIOLATION OF
TERMS THAT WERE NOT EXPLICITLY SET FORTH IN THE PLEA
AGREEMENT. THAT WAS ERROR.
A. AN AGREEMENT FOR A PLEA-IN-ABEYANCE MUST CONTAIN
EXPLICIT CONDITIONS.
(1) Utah Law Requires the Agreement to Include a Full Detailed Recitation of the
Terms, Title 77, Chapter 2a governs plea-in-abeyance agreements. It states the
following:
(a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecution and the
defendant and approved by the court shall include a full, detailed recitation of the
requirements and conditions agreed to by the defendant and the reason for
requesting the court to hold the plea in abeyance.
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and felonies, the
agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance by the court, be
executed by the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's counsel in
the presence of the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(4); see also id. at § 77-2a-l(l) (requiring conditions to be set
forth in the plea-in-abeyance agreement); State v. Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, ^[109 21
P.3d 249 (defining a plea-in-abeyance agreement). By its plain language, the statute
requires an agreement to "include a full, detailed recitation" of the conditions, and it
requires the agreement to be in writing if the plea is for a felony.
Also, Rule 11 governs plea agreements. It states that a court may not accept a plea
in a case until it has made findings as to "what agreement has been reached." Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e)(6) (2010); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(l)(a). To that end, "[t]he
trial judge should [still] review the statements in the affidavit with the defendant, ques-
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tion the defendant concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements
imposed by Frule 111 on the record" before accepting the plea. State v. Lehi, 2003 UT
App 212, TflO, 73 P.3d 985 (alterations in original; citation omitted); see also Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e) (the trial court's findings for the plea agreement "may be based on
questioning of the defendant on the record" or a "written statement" where the court has
established that the defendant read, understood, and acknowledged the statement).
Likewise, case law requires the terms of a plea agreement to be explicit and
unambiguous. See United States v. Burns, 160 F.3d 82, 83 (1st Cir.1998) ("significant
plea-agreement terms should be stated explicitly and unambiguously so as to preclude
their subsequent circumvention by either party"); see also State v. Mora, 2003 UT App
117, Tfl9, 69 P.3d 838 ('"[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified
during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea
colloquy'" (citation omitted)). A trial court must ensure that an agreement is clear to all
parties and it must ensure that defendant has a full understanding of the terms and
conditions of the plea. See, e.g. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^22, 26 P.3d 203 (the
purpose of Rule 11 is to ensure that the defendant's plea is knowing and voluntary and he
is aware of the consequences of a plea); see also State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312
(Utah 1987) ("Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is
entered").
(2) Ambiguous Terms in a Plea Agreement Are Construed in Favor of the
Defendant. "Many courts, including the Utah Supreme Court and the United States
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Supreme Court, have referred to plea agreements as contracts/' but principles in contract
law "' cannot be blindly incorporated into the criminal law in the area of plea
bargaining.'" State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 386-387 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting
United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1980); see also United States v.
Oiesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541, 542 (8th Cir.1990) ("[p]lea agreements are like contracts;
however, they are not contracts, and therefore contract doctrines do not always apply to
them;" also "[t]his court has . . . acknowledged the inherent limits of the contract
analogy") (emphasis in original)).
"For example, in interpreting plea agreements or determining their validity, courts
may in certain circumstances hold the government to a higher standard than the
defendant." Patience, 944 P.2d at 387 (citing United States v. Ringling, 988 F.2d 504,
506 (4th Cir. 1993) ('"[B]oth constitutional and supervisory concerns require holding the
government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant... for imprecisions or
ambiguities in plea agreements'") (quoting United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300
(4th Cir. 1986))). Specifically, a court may construe ambiguities against the government
and in favor of the defendant. See, e.g.. United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523
(11th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir.
2002); In re Altro, 180 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1999). That is because, unlike ordinary
contracts, the government enjoys significant bargaining power and the plea agreement
calls for a defendant to waive fundamental constitutional rights. See, e.g. Altro, 180 F.3d
at 375; Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 1523.
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(3) A Trial Court May Revoke an Agreement if the Defendant Has Failed to
Substantially Comply with the Terms. Utah statutory law states the following,
If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement information
comes to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that the defendant
has violated any condition of the agreement, the court, at the request of the
prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion and affidavit, or upon its own
motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear before the court at a
designated time and place to show cause why the court should not find the terms
of the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not be
terminated. If, following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant
has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of the plea in
abeyance agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter judgment of
conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the offense to which the
original plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of conviction and imposition
of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to
termination of the agreement shall be credited against any fine imposed by the
court.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l); Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, f 14 (agreeing that a "plea in
abeyance differs from probation in both its statutory provisions and function. Thus, cases
decided under the probation statutes are not directly applicable to pleas in abeyance").
In construing § 77-2a-4, this Court begins with the plain language. See Turnbow,
2001 UT App 59, Tfl6. The plain language of the statute allows the trial court to
terminate a plea-in-abeyance agreement if the court finds that the defendant "failed to
substantially comply" with the terms or conditions. The phrase "substantially comply" or
"substantial performance" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary for plain-language
construction. Under the substantial-compliance doctrine, if a party's "good-faith
attempt to perform does not precisely meet the terms of an agreement or statutory
requirements," but the essential purpose is accomplished, performance is considered to be
complete. Black's Law Dictionary, 1566 (9th ed. 2009). That is, under substantial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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compliance, a party accomplishes the essential purpose of the agreement with a good
faith attempt, even if the party does not specifically meet the terms of the agreement. In
addition, under the doctrine, the party is "subject to a claim for damages" for any
shortfall. IcL; see also State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Utah 1991) (early cases
required the trial court to comply substantially with the law when taking a guilty plea;
under that standard, the supreme court may uphold a plea where the trial judge "made no
inquiry into the elements of the offense charged and their relationship to the facts", but it
may not uphold a plea which results in a "significant departure from Rule 11" and
"considerable doubt as to whether a defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary").
B. THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT MARTIN VIOLATED THE
AGREEMENT BY ASSISTING THE LICENSED THIRD PARTY WITH THE
WORK. YET THE PLEA AGREEMENT DID NOT PROHIBIT MARTIN
FROM ASSISTING.
In this case, Martin and the State entered into a plea agreement on September 29,
2005, wherein Martin entered into a no-contest plea for criminal mischief (a third degree
felony), and he agreed to replace a chain-link fence and foliage that were removed from
Ms. Randazzo's yard. R.55. Also, the agreement required Martin "to have the work
done by a licensed third party." Id. In addition, Martin was under a "no contact" order;
he was prohibited from trespassing on Ms. Randazzo's property. R.9.
On July 28, 2006, the state filed an order to show cause alleging violations of the
agreement. R. 108-110. On January 19, 2007, the trial court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on the matter. R.197. At the conclusion of the evidence and over the objections
of defense counsel, R. 197:56-59, the trial court ruled that Martin had violated the
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agreement when he assisted the third party with the work. The judge stated:
I think [Mr. Martin has] frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind, the work was
not done as ordered by a third-party.
At least what I've heard - and I'll let you address it if you want. One, I don't hear
anything to suggest he's violated the no contact order. Two, the shrubbery, no real
basis for finding that. Three, the tree, frankly, the order is ambiguous. If it wasn't
ambiguous, you wouldn't be offering that sapling as a replacement, that's certainly doesn't violate the letter; you've absolutely violated the spirit of the
agreement. And last, though, is the third-party agreement, that it be done by a
licensed third party. You know, one of the reasons was - that is, so we wouldn't
have this exact kind of issue. The fact is, color it however you want, he was out
there with a third-party doing the work, and not supervised by the third-party at all
times.
R. 197:55-56 (emphasis added); see also id. at 197:57 (stating the order required that "all
work be[] done by a third-party, and you tell me he's just assisting, and somebody is
looking over his shoulder. It's not being done by him. And, frankly, he's admitting that
he wasn't supervised at all times by the third-party"); id. at 197:59 ("My ruling as to the
plea in abeyance goes solely to not having all work done by a licensed third-party"). The
trial court's ruling is attached as Addendum C.
In this case, Martin does not dispute that the evidence presented at the show-cause
hearing supports that he was "out there with a third-party doing the work," he "wasn't
supervised at all times by the third-party," R.197:56, 57, and he did not have all work
done solely by the licensed third party. R.197:59. Indeed, the evidence supports that
Martin worked with a licensed third party, Evan Lee, to replace and reinforce the fence.
See R.197:47, 48; Defendant's Exhibits 5 & 7. Martin acknowledged that Lee and he did
the work together; Martin assisted when needed; and he was able to assist without
trespassing on Ms. Randazzo's property. R.197:47-50, 52-53; see also R.197:32-34, 36
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(Stacey Poppleton saw Martin working on the corner end post fitting an end cap). He
acknowledged that Lee was not present at all times throughout installation of the fence,
but Lee did most of the work and he was there "[t]he majority of the time." R. 197:50, 55.
Martin poured the concrete to secure the posts and design of the fence. R. 197:50-51.
Also, Martin presented evidence relating to the vines on Ms. Randazzo's property
(see R. 197:45-46; Defendant's Exhibit 3); and he testified that he purchased a tree as a
replacement for the elm, but did not know what to do with it. R. 197:53-54. He contacted
his attorney for advice and tried communicating with the assistant district attorney but
received no information. Id Martin testified that the tree was still available. R. 197:54.
Martin's testimony is attached as Addendum D.
Based on the evidence here, Martin complied with the terms of the plea-inabeyance agreement. Where the trial court ruled that Martin violated the agreement, that
ruling was in error and an abuse of discretion for several reasons.
First, under the plain language of § 77-2a-2(4), the trial court was required to
include "a full, detailed recitation" of the conditions enforceable against defendant in the
agreement, and the agreement was required to be in writing. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a2(4); Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l(l) (specific conditions must be set forth in the agreement); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6) (a trial court may not accept a plea until it has made
findings as to "what agreement has been reached"); Burns, 160 F.3d at 83 (significant
terms of the agreement should be stated explicitly and unambiguously "so as to preclude
their subsequent circumvention by either party"); Mora, 2003 UT App 117, ^[19 ("'[a]ny
omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing, as
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must any uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy'") (citation omitted).
If the trial court had intended to prevent Martin from assisting the third party in
the work, the trial court was required to include that condition expressly in the agreement.
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-2(4), 77-2a-l(l); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6); Burns,
160 F.3d at 83; Mora, 2003 UT App 117, Tf 19. As it stands, the written agreement did
not prohibit Martin from assisting with or doing some work; it did not require that the
work be done exclusively or solely by a third party; and it did not mandate that a third
party supervise Martin at all times. R.55 (requiring Martin to "replace the chain link
fence and replant an elm tree that defendant removed[,] and replace the shrubs destroyed
and to have the work done by a licensed third party"). In short, a "full, detailed recitation
of the requirements" (Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(4)) did not include the restrictions
identified at the show-cause hearing by the trial court. Compare R.55, and R. 197:55-57.
Thus, the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that Martin violated a provision
not specified in the agreement. See Petersen, 810 P.2d at 425 ("[Tjrial courts do not have
discretion to misapply the law").
Second, the trial court's post-hoc interpretation of the agreement - to preclude
Martin from assisting the third-party contractor and from doing the work - was improper.
Under the law of plea agreements, where terms are ambiguous, a court will construe them
against the government. See, e.g., In re Altro, 180 F.3d at 375; Jefferies, 908 F.2d at
1523; see also Bickley, 2002 UT App 342,1fi[l2-l3 (the trial court failed to firmly
establish defendant's responsibilities at the time of the agreement, resulting in error); see
also Mora, 2003 UT App 117,1J19 ("'[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must
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be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course of the
plea colloquy'" (cite omitted)). That is because unlike ordinary contracts, a plea
agreement calls for a defendant to waive fundamental constitutional rights. See In re
Altro, 180 F.3d at 375; Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 1523.
Here, the trial court interpreted the language in the agreement - requiring Martin
to "replace the chain link fence" and "have the work done by a licensed third party," R.55
- to require the work to be done exclusively and solely by a licensed third party without
assistance from Martin. R. 197:55-57. But the agreement was silent on that point. See
R.55. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion when it interpreted or imported
language into the agreement against Martin for a violation here. See R. 197:23, 56-58.
Third, Martin substantially complied with the terms of the agreement. Where the
agreement required Martin to "replace the chain link fence and replant an elm tree that
defendant removed[,] and replace the shrubs destroyed and to have the work done by a
licensed third party," R.55, the trial court ruled that Martin did not violate the agreement
on the no-contact order and shrubbery; and it ruled that the agreement for the tree was
ambiguous. Therefore, the court found no violation there. R. 197:55-56. In addition, the
evidence shows that Martin made bona fide efforts to satisfy the final term of the
agreement by replacing the chain-link fence.
Specifically, Martin replaced and reinforced the fence, R.55, 197:45; and while he
was not supervised in the work at all times, he assisted with building the fence and the
work was "done by a licensed third party." R.55; 197:48-49; R. 197:55-57 (ruling that
Martin was "out there with a third-party doing the work," he was assisting and he "wasn't
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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supervised at all times by the third-party"). Martin and the third-party contractor worked
together at times. R. 197:49. The third party "did most of the work on, as far as tying off
of the fence, and installing the electrical rod, which is required for grounding of a chainlink fence." R. 197:50. The third party was there "[t]he majority of the time" for the
work, R. 197:50; and Martin was present: he "offered assistance when needed" and
poured concrete. R.197:49-51, 55.
The record shows Martin's good faith attempt to comply and it shows that Martin
accomplished the essential purpose of the agreement by building the fence. The record
supports substantial compliance. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l) (requiring substantial
compliance); Black's Law Dictionary, 1566 (defining substantial performance or
compliance). There was no "significant departure" which would lead to "considerable
doubt" (Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1125 (discussing substantial compliance in the context of a plea
agreement)) about whether Martin "replace[d] the chain link fence" and "ha[d] the work
done by a licensed third party." R.55, 60. In this case, the trial court failed to acknowledge the substantial-compliance standard set forth in the statute. See Utah Code Ann. §
77-2a-4; see also R. 197:55-57 (making no mention of the statute). Where the record
supports that standard, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to apply it. See
Petersen, 810 P.2d at 425 ("[T]rial courts do not have discretion to misapply the law").
CONCLUSION
To the extent the agreement may be construed as represented by the trial judge at
the show-cause hearing, that construction was not explained to Martin when he entered
into the agreement, and it cannot apply to him at this juncture. Also, that construction
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was ambiguous. Moreover, Martin substantially complied with the terms of the
agreement. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that Martin
violated the agreement. Martin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court
ruling and reinstate the agreement since Martin was not in violation of its terms and
conditions.
SUBMITTED this

7 ^

day of April, 2011.

M? %

Linda M. Jones
SALT LAKE LEGftL DEFENDER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
NOTICE

vs,
MICHAEL C MARTIN,
Defendant.

Case No: 041907590 FS
Judge:
DENO *HIMONAS
Date:
August 28, 2009

PRESENT
Clerk:
krisu
Prosecutor: BURMESTER, BYRON F
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): FUELLING, BRENNON L
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 28, 1963
Audio
Tape Number:
S44
Tape Count: 2:15
CHARGES
2. CRIMINAL/MISCHIEF - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: No Contest - Disposition: 03/09/2007 Guilty
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF a Class A
Misdemeanor^ the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s) .
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 2
Fine: $2500,00
>Suspended: $2500.00
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Prihcipal Due:
t

$2500.00
$2500.00
$0
$0
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 12 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by THIRD DISTRICT COURT.
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Case No: 041907590
Date:
Aug 28, 2009
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Violate no laws.
Pay full & complete restitution.
Complete 25' hours of community service with proof to the court
within 6 months.
RESTITUTION HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 11/06/2009
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - S44
Third District Court
450 South State
SLG# UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENO HIMONAS
Date;

f/&td#

__

4&r+

DENO HIMONAS
District Court

Individuals needing special accommodations (including
,_
communicative aids and services) should call Third District
Court-Salt Lake at (801)238-7500 three days prior to the hearing,
For TTY service call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128. The general
information; phone number is (801)238-7300,

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY,
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON RUE IN
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COI
OF UTAH,

-. I
DATE::

\<XAXL

$&Ma

l
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
MANNING HEARING/ORDER

vs.
MICHAEL C MARTIN,
Defendant.

Case No: 041907590 FS
Judge:
DENO HIMONAS
Date:
December 17, 2010

PRESENT
Clerk:
kristenl
Prosecutor: BURMESTER, BYRON F
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SIMMS, CLAYTON A
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 28, 1963
Audio
Tape Number:
S44
Tape Count: 2:51-3:13
CHARGES
2. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea:" No Contest - Disposition: 03/09/2007 Guilty
HEARING
Start times: .2:28, 2:41 and 2:51,
COUNT: 2:52
Defendant is sworn and testifies on his own behalf.
COUNT: 3:05
Cross examination.
COUNT: 3:05
Re-direct>
COUNT: 3:06
Argument, Court denies the motion to strike. Court is
reinstating the time for appeal. Defendant.,has 30 d^ys from today
to file appeal.

Date:

/&,
Vnh/<"

Dfl&D'HlMONi
District

I CERTIFY THATTHIS IS ATRUF COPY OF AH
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE JHIR0
DISTRICT COURT.SAU LAKE COUNTY. STATOFUTAH,

ZZ^p^g^iC-t
Page 1 ( l a s t )
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-l
§ 77-2a-l. Definitions
For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that
time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on
condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance
agreement.
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which,
following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-2
§ 77-2a-2. Plea in abeyance agreement—Negotiation—Contents—Terms of
agreement—Waiver of time for sentencing

(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest but prior to entry of
judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, the court may, upon motion of both
the prosecuting attorney and the defendant, hold the plea in abeyance and not enter
judgment of conviction against the defendant nor impose sentence upon the defendant
within the time periods contained in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel during negotiations for a plea in
abeyance and at the time of acknowledgment and affirmation of any plea in abeyance
agreement unless the defendant shall have knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel.
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at any court hearing relating
to a plea in abeyance agreement.

(4)(a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecution and the
defendant and approved by the court shall include a full, detailed recitation of the
requirements and conditions agreed to by the defendant and the reason for requesting the
court to hold the plea in abeyance.
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and felonies, the
agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance by the court, be executed by
the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's counsel in the presence of
the court.
(5) A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18 months if the plea
was to any class of misdemeanor or longer than three years if the plea was to any degree
of felony or to any combination of misdemeanors and felonies.
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(6) A plea in abeyance agreement shall not be approved unless the defendant, before the
court, and any written agreement, knowingly and intelligently waives time for sentencing
as designated in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-3
§ 77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea-Powers of court

(l)(a) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance agreement shall be
done in full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
(b) In cases charging offenses for which bail may be forfeited, a plea in abeyance
agreement may be entered into without a personal appearance before a magistrate.
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon finding that the
defendant has successfully completed the terms of the agreement:
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction and impose
sentence for a lower degree of offense; or
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's plea and order the dismissal of the case.
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms of a plea in
abeyance agreement, the court may reduce the degree of the offense or dismiss the case
only as provided in the plea in abeyance agreement or as agreed to by all parties. Upon
sentencing a defendant for any lesser offense pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement,
the court may not invoke Section 76-3-402 to further reduce the degree of the offense.
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections to assist in the administration of
the plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were on probation to the court under
Section 77-18-1.
(5) The terms of a plea in abeyance agreement may include:
(a) an order that the defendant pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance fee, with a
surcharge based on the amount of the plea in abeyance fee, both of which shall be
allocated in the same manner as if paid as a fine for a criminal conviction under Section
78A-5-110 and a surcharge under Title 51, Chapter 9, Part 4, Criminal Conviction
Digitized by
the Howard
W. Hunter
Library,
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Law School,
Surcharge Allocation,
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which
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not
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surcharge which could have been imposed upon conviction and sentencing for the same
offense;
(b) an order that the defendant pay restitution to the victims of the defendant's actions
as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act;
(c) an order that the defendant pay the costs of any remedial or rehabilitative program
required by the terms of the agreement; and
(d) an order that the defendant comply with any other conditions which could have
been imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction and sentencing for the same
offense.
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both the prosecuting
attorney and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting attorney not to agree to a plea in
abeyance is final.
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual offense against a
victim who is under the age of 14.
(8) Beginning on July 1, 2008, no plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a
driving under the influence violation under Section 41-6a-502.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2a-4
§ 77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement—Hearing—Entry of judgment
and imposition of sentence—Subsequent prosecutions
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, information comes to the
attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that the defendant has violated any condition of
the agreement, the court, at the request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion
and affidavit, or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear
before the court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court should not find the
terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not be terminated.
If, following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant has failed to substantially
comply with any term or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the
agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the
offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of conviction and
imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to
termination of the agreement shall be credited against any fine imposed by the court.
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry of judgment of
conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any independent prosecution arising from
any offense that constituted a violation of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the
original plea was placed in abeyance.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
20070426-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs

Case No. 041907590 FS

MICHAEL M. MARTIN,

Hon. Deno G. Himonas

Defendant/Appellant.

THE ABOVE captioned matter came before the
Honorable Deno G. Himonas, on January 19, 2007, at the
Matheson Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah.

For the State
FRED BURMESTER
TOM LOPRESTO
Deputy DAf s
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KEVIN KURUMADA
Attorney at Law
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Deputy ClmK

1

Siberian elm.

2

Q.

Do you know what kind of tree it is?

3

A.

I believe it's a maple tree.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

MR. KURUMADA:

6

That's all I have.

7

Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

8

BY MR. BURMESTER:

9

Q.

Who replaced the fence?

10

A.

Mr. Lee.

11

Q.

All right.

12

A.

Yes, I was there present and he did the

13

But you were there?

tying off of the fence.

14

Q.

When?

15

A.

When?

16

Exact —

THE COURT:

in the course of this —

I've heard enough,

17 Mr. Burmester.
18

MR. BURMESTER:

19

You don't want anymore

examination?

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. BURMESTER:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. KURUMADA:

That's fine.

24

THE COURT:

Mr. Kurumada, I think he's

25

(Inaudible) .
Okay.

I don't think so, I mean —

—

frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind, the work

I
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1

was not done as ordered by a third-party.
At least what I!ve heard —

2

and IT11 let

One, I donft hear

3

you address it if you want.

4

anything to suggest he's violated the no contact

5

order.

6

that.

7

ambiguous.

8

offering that sapling as a replacement, that's

9

certainly doesn't violate the letter/ you' ve

Two, the shrubbery, no real basis for finding
Three, the tree, frankly, the order is
If it wasn't ambiguous, you wouldn't be
—

10

absolutely violated the spirit of the agreement.

And

11

last, though, is the third-party agreement, that it be

12

done by a licensed third-party.

13

reasons was —

14

kind of issue.

You know, one of the

that is, so we wouldn't have this exact
The fact is, color it however you

15 want, he was out there with a third-party doing the
16 work, and not supervised by the third-party at all
17 times.
18

MR. KURUMADA:

The only argument I'd

19

offer, Your Honor, is:

The work is supposed to be

20

done by a third-party, but it's not —

21

THE COURT:

All work.

22

MR. KURUMADA:

It's not —

it doesn't

23 prohibit him from assisting a third party.

And that's

24

what he's doing, he's trying to assist labor to cover

25

the costs.

I

,—__
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1

THE COURT:

You can sit down.

2

MR. KURUMADA:

3

THE COURT:

That's

—

Well, then all work isn * t

4

being done by a third-party.

I mean, the order is all

5

work being done by a third-party, and you tell me he's

6

just assisting, and somebody is looking over his

7

shoulder.

8

he's admitted that he wasn't supervised at all times

9

by the third-party.

It's not being done by him.

And, frankly,

10

You can step down, Mr. Martin.

11

THE WITNESS:

12

MR. KURUMADA:

13

MR. BURMESTER:

14

All right.
We'd rest.
We'd submit it,

Your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

All right.

I'm revoking the

16 plea in abeyance.
17

MR. BURMESTER:

18

Your Honor, we would ask

that we do a PSR, and that way we can determine a

19 value of the restitution, and then we can just talk
20

about money instead of different people putting things

21

in question.

22

THE COURT:

23

record:

24

affidavit.

25

I'll make it clear for the

There are four allegations, I believe, in the

MR. BURMESTER:

I

Your Honor, I think the
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1

one is just an assertion that the Court made some

2

orders, so it would really be three allegations of

3

violation:

4

Two, 3 and 4.
THE COURT:

Mr. Kurumada, if you think If m

5

wrong, this is your chance to argue, but Ifm letting

6

you know what IT m thinking.

7

Let me put it differently:

I know you

8

think I'm wrong, this is still your chance to convince

9

me, but that's --

10

MR. KURUMADA:

Well, all I would say,

11

Judge, is that I think Mr. Martin did the best he

12

could in terms of respecting the Court's order.

13

did have someone who did the majority of the work with

14

respect to the fence.

15

as good as Ms. Randazzo wanted, but she also wanted

16

and eight-foot vinyl fence, too, and that was totally

17

not in the spirit of the plea negotiation or the plea

18

in abeyance.

It wasn't as —

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. KURUMADA:

21

supposed furnish a tree.

22

to go out and find a 50-foot elm tree.

23

THE COURT:

it wasn't maybe

Clearly not.
And, you know, he was
You are not going to be able

You can find replacement

Itfs expensive, but thatfs what happens when

24

trees.

25

you chop down mature trees.

I

He
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Now, I understand that we didnft talk

1
2

about it, and I donft know if I would have ordered,

3

you know, a 50-foot elm tree or —

4

wouldnft have been a sapling.

5

something that has about a —

6

diameter either.

7

MR. KURUMADA:

8

THE COURT:

9

what I do know, it

It wouldn't have been
you know, two-inch

Uh-huh.

Be that as it may, I'm not

revoking on that because of the ambiguity.

10

MR. KURUMADA:

11

THE COURT:

That's fine --

I'm just indicating for

12 purposes of my ruling, I do believe it's ambiguous.
13

do believe that Mr. Martin at least violated the

14

spirit of that, but because of its ambiguity, in no

15 way, shape or —
16

no way, shape or form —

I

in ruling

that he violated the plea in abeyance as a result.

17

My ruling as to the plea in abeyance goes

18

solely to not having all work done by a licensed

19

third-party, period.

20

MR. KURUMADA:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. KURUMADA:

Okay.

I understand.

That's the sole basis.
Do you want to set —

do

23 you want a PSR?
24

THE COURT:

25

Do I need a Presentence Report

for this?

I

__
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1

MR. KURUMADA:

2

THE COURT:

3

Thank you very much.

4

(State's Exhibit No. 10 Marked and

5

Admitted.)

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. LOPRESTO:

8

THE COURT:

9

Mr. Kurumada.

10

MR. KURUMADA:

No objection.

I'll receive it.
1

Anybody else?
No, Your Honor.

Thank you.

We'll call Mr. Martin.

MICHAEL MARTIN,

11
12

called as a witness on his own behalf,

13

having been duly sworn, was examined

14

and testified as follows:
THE COURT:

15

DIRECT EXAMINATION

16
17

Go ahead, Mr. Kurumada.

BY MR. KURUMADA:

18

Q.

State your name for the record, please?

19

A.

Michael Martin.

20

Q.

You are the neighbor of Ms. Randazzo, is

21

that correct?

22

A.

That's correct.

23

Q.

And you've been in a long dispute, civil

24
25

as well as criminal, with Ms. Randazzo?
A.

No, that's not —

as far as —

did you say
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1 criminal, too.
2

Q.

Yes?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

You went to court, at one point, to

try to establish a property line, is that right?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

Okay.

Why did you remove this fence?

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. KURUMADA:

10 because

Does it matter?
I think so, Judge,

—

11

You did remove the fence?

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. KURUMADA:

14

Let me ask you:

Doesn't matter.
Okay.
Where —

where did you

15 get this -•- oh, I should have this marked as 5.
16

(Discussion off the Record.)

17

MR. KURUMADA:

18

THE COURT:

Six.

Mr. Kurumada, I understand

19

from my experience with the case, Mr. Martin, if I

20

recall correctly, believed he had a right to remove

21

the fence.

That's not where we are now, right?

I

22 mean, he's acknowledged liability, so why would his
23 motivation make any difference at this point?
24
25

MR. KURUMADA:

Well, Your Honor, he is

contesting the fact that he did replace the fence, it
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1 was done properly.
2

THE COURT:

I understand that, but why

3 does it matter why he originally tore down the fence?
4
5

MR. KURUMADA:
there.

6

Did you replace the fence?

7

A.

Yes, I did.

8

Q.

Twice?

9

A.

No.

10

Okay, I agree with you

There was only one time it was

replaced and then it was reinforced to what was

11 necessary per her complaint.
12

Q.

Let me show you Exhibit 3 and ask you:

Do

13 you recognize that photograph?
14

A.

I do.
MR. KURUMADA:

15

You've seen that haven't

16 you, Fred?
17

MR. BURMESTER:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. BURMESTER:

20

MR. KURUMADA:

21

Which number?

Defendant's Exhibit 3.
Okay.
Okay.

When did you take

that photograph?

22

A.

This winter, this year.

23

Q.

All right.

Do you know approximately

24 when?
25

A.

Within the last 30 to 60 days.
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1

Q.

All right.
Now, the vines that Ms. Randazzo says you

2
3

took out, are they reflected in this photograph as

4

growing back?

5

A.

Yes, it —

the vines are reflected in that

6 photograph.
7

Q.

8

taken?

9

A.

Now, this is Exhibit 4.

When was that

That was taken about the time we had civil

10

issues of that tree being destructive to private

11

property.

12

Q.

Now, let me direct your attention to the

13

middle of this photograph:

That fence is different

14

from this fence in Exhibit 3, is that correct?

15

A.

That is correct.

16

Q.

Is that because the old fence has been

17
18

replaced by the new fence?
A.

This is an older fence on different

19 property.

Actually, that's a different property, and

20

that fence has been taken down since —

during this

21

dispute.

I probably

22

could find it.

23

Q.

I don't know the exact date.

Okay —

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. KURUMADA:

Offer 3 and 4?
Yes.
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1

THE COURT:

Any objection?

2

MR. LOPRESTO:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. KURUMADA:

5

(Defendants Exhibit Nos. 3 & 4 Marked

6

and Admitted.)

7

MR. KURUMADA:

8

you in the construction of the fence?

No, Your Honor.

If11 receive them.
Thank you.

Mr. Martin, who assisted

9

A.

Mr. Evan Lee.

10

Q.

And how do you know Mr. Evan Lee?

11

A.

He ! s personally worked on the property for

12

20 years.

13

Q.

Do you know what his profession is?

14

A.

Electrician slash handyman.

15

Q.

And when you say "slash handyman", what

16

does that mean?

17

A.

He f s been involved in all sorts of
He!s done more than just

18

handyman-type activities.

19

electrician work on the property.

20

cleanup and different things like that.

21

Q.

22

He ! s helped with

Let me hand you that other exhibit,

(Inaudible) , very short letter —

oh, never mind.

23

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 5 Marked.)

24

MR. KURUMADA:

25

Let me show you (Handing)

what!s been marked Exhibit 5.

1
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What is that?

1
A.

2

A letter signed by Mr. Lee stating that I

3

invited him to assist in the installation of the

4

fence, and he did so.
Q.

5

Okay

—

6

(Discussion off the Record.)

7

MR. KURUMADA:

8

With respect to Mr. Lee,

how did you find him?

9

A.

Personal acquaintance.

10

Q.

Okay.

Has he done work for you in the

11 past?
12

A.

Yes, he has.

13

Q.

Is that his website or a website that

14

indicates that that's what he does?
A.

15
16

Yes, that's his State sites indicating

that he's a licensed electrician.

17

Q.

18

the fence?

19

A.

And he assisted you in the construction of

Yes.

20

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 7 Marked.)

21

MR. KURUMADA:

22

I'd offer 5 and 6 --

actually, this is marked 7.

23

I'll offer 5 and 7.

24

Do you have any objection?

25

MR. BURMESTER:

:

:

Not on the website thing.
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1
2

MR. KURUMADA:

That just establishes

his --

3

MR. BURMESTER:

The latter, if I may just

4 wait until I can do cross-examination?
5

THE COURT:

You want to voir dire in aid

6 of an objection, go ahead.
7
8
9
10

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. BURMESTER:
Q.

I'm referring to State's Exhibit —

looking —

I have it, sorry —

Defendant's Exhibit 5.

11 Will you take a look at that?
12

Lee says in that letter that he helped

13 you, is that correct?
14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Install a fence?

16

A.

I asked him to assist, yes.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

And you helped him and he helped

you put the fence in the ground —

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

—

21

A.

I provided materials and he assisted in

22
23
24
25

together?

finishing up the fence.
Q.

Okay.

Did you put it in the ground with

the assistance of Mr. Lee?
A.

With his assistance —

he needed
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assistance, and I offered assistance when needed.
kay

" '
"

Yi)"i;' w-:i'n

then • '
"

Il wi-i..i there a n y t i m e t h a t h e
d i d m u s t ul
fence,

I I HI Willi II-' 1 mi ni

and i n s t a l l i n g

I

he

nil1; lai, i i ; lyi. in.) uf f

I. I In

t h e e l e c t r i c a l , r o d , which

teqi/i i m d l"m «i r ouikil I I n\

I n

I MI

I

I- I o n c e

is

lm

II m -

™ which roquires an electrician I" o be involved, su lie::1
a ;n. s i

fitful

ni II II II in i I ' 1" h J IIUC'I

Iuu ,

He a l s o p r o v i d e d t h e f e n c e a n d t h e
i ' -:

meshincj,

f

j o m o t h 11n | i, 11 11

II i i;.; •

inventory.
THE COT JRT •
installation?
THE WITNESS:
tii lie h e was t h e r e

Nn

Tl n IT a - j o r i t y

nf IMI •••

II, a s s i s t e d w i t h s e t t i n g t h e p o s t ,

w h i c h n e e d e d some e x p e i *• a r s i *::li.a,»^I'-e, ,bec,::iriG'n I i mr,
taking a class
theoz j

in c o n s t r u c t i o n

-

concrete

And n e e d e d h i ho IVM nfcn i V-M I

be s t r o n g enoucr^

+

"o h o l d u n a f e n c e

t y p e o f a s e v e r e ~hak i

*

n e e d e d some a s s i s t a n t -

-.

T*ra e

^.

~-^ j ^

A

T r^nnr

concrete

n I iial

i I wi m I d

J f t h e r e was any

Uie l^-nce

So Hi i I III' i

development ol" t h e

fence

^ u dxg t h e holo. 1 ,

JURMESTEP
^r^o

-•

T\r\

the fence
ito

concrete

: n t o "the c o n c r e t e
into the post
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secure the design of the engineering that I felt was
necessary to help secure those posts.
And this State1s Exhibit 7, does it —

Q.

THE COURT:

Defendant's Exhibit 7.

MR. BURMESTER:

Defendant's Exhibit 7.

Does it state who he f s licensed with and for what
profession?
A.

It says that he's licensed with the State

of Utah as a Master Electrician.
Q.

Does it say anything about fence

installation?
A.

Fence installation, no, it does not.
MR. BURMESTER:

Okay.

No objection, Your

Honor,
THE COURT:

I'll receive it.

(Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 5 and 7
Admitted.)
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DIRECT EXAMINATION

(resumed)

BY" MR., KURUMM3A:
Wo „ when 'you Install a metal fence, you' ve

„),
got

t o fvi v: j -i •<

• "I ect:.i ,.i ,: i a11 i

g i, ,11 I J I

A c c o r d i n g t o t h e mttanufacturer f s w a r r a n t y „,

"'•'

L£ you w e r e t o

i n f\ I:.HI 1 1 HI i.vil <
" arm v.orl t.'encc! you h«five I o

f o l l o w "'"'" '"'J', t a i n w a r r a n t y r u l e s which r e q u i r e
electrician

t o ho

i \w n I \ H >i1 i

im-iko s u r e

that,

an
r l i o ^ i i , i:

.lines a r e not above or c e r t a i n - s i z e d power l i n e s
n o t w i t h i n s o many feet" nil" the 1 frm i
t o f a J 1 on t h e

are

in r a s e .'1110. wv»xe

fence.

And x i s o m e t h i n u wor

h i I ,-i I II / m i lIHlhi -,»

fence, that it's properly grounded even 11 £ lighting
were to strike.
Q

"Ukay,

A.

Yes, he came 011 II' liio first ij.i1* n h. bseivi/

And that's what he did as well

you know, what was necessary as it pertained to his
€ixpertise.
i,}

Now, you a m under a court order not to go

on her property, is that right?
A.

I'lial: '
"
' s correct

Q.

So, you couldn't go on the other side? of

he 1 property and you —

IT. help .install the fence.

Did you ever do that 9
\.

Il 11 e v e r ciixJ,
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1
2

Q.

Okay, you stayed on that easement

—

concrete easement area?

3

A.

I clearly stayed on private property.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

Now, with respect to the elm tree,

you did purchase an elm tree?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

Now, you were not directed by the order of

8

the court to replace a 40-foot elm tree, were you?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

You were just told to furnish another elm

11

tree that could be planted?

12

A.

Correct.

13

Q.

And several times you inquired of me as to

14

whether you should deliver that tree and I said, "No,"

15

is that correct?

16

A.

That's correct.

17

Q.

Because of the outstanding order?

18

A.

Correct.

19

Q.

Did you ever attempt —

20

to contact her either, correct?

21

A.

That's correct.

22

Q.

Ms. Randazzo.

23

you were told not

Did you make any effort through another

24

party to indicate to her that you had purchased an elm

25

tree, and you were trying to get it to her, but you
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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were afraid to qo on luri" property?
'

Y

i " < i" ' 'nccited I

"i, n , iiiii i,l 1 b e l i e v e

we tried to communicate with the D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y to
contact
-? • .i • it was Clark Harms?

^
rx.

,

1 tflin I"ihiMr"' | t e u p . i e w e i : o

w e r e t e l l i n g me t h a i

m m11

\ 11

w<, wore isrying t o c o m m u n i c a t e ,

a n d I t r i e d t o foil In" w I h r o u q h t h r e e

tiieis I »

f i n d o u t i f a n y b o d y was m a k i n g a n a t t e m p t ; t o
c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h Ms, Randazr.n thrill

I IIP t r e e Wr"i,v.

a v a i l a b l e a n d we n e e d a p l a c e t o p l a n t I t .
,,)

Right.

And t h a t i MIS, l he C o u n t y Air t o i

y a s g o i n g t o d o t h a t a t: 1,1" i a I t ime ?
i\.

Tl ia L" s c o r r e c t .

Q

Did y o u e v e r r e c e i v e a n y i n f o r m a t i o n

rue o r the? C o u n t y A t t o r n e y
contacted by

that, Ms N.-mdci zz,n hr.nl I u ><

Harms, t h e P r o s e c u t o r ,

p i c k up t h e t r e e ,

Nri

!;., t ;i e 111 H II., L».." i

Okay

A .

ni i

HI 1' i i H l l i a t I

t o g i v e t o yo

I h a v e l o c e i v e d n o communxcatJ nor

. i:.. 1.1 > a d v a n c e

Q

a n d t o .Id t;n 'i

o r q.ivo vou :i;i m octi our

do wi LIn i t , o r g i v e hum d i r e c t i o n s
A,

i. 1.

Is; LLat tree s t i l l available ?
n
i I

from

in i .

Q.

And i t T s

A.

n
i lit." Liu vo i I " u rj b e t t e r t r e e t h a n a

t h e same k i n d of t r e e ?
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1

Siberian elm.

2

Q.

Do you know what kind of tree it is?

3

A.

I believe it's a maple tree.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

MR. KURUMADA:

6

That's all I have.

7
8

Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BURMESTER:

9

Q.

Who replaced the fence?

10

A.

Mr. Lee.

11

Q.

All right.

12

A.

Yes, I was there present and he did the

13

tying off of the fence.

14

Q.

When?

15

A.

When?

16

But you were there?

Exact —

THE COURT:

in the course of this —

I've heard enough,

17 Mr. Burmester.
18
19

MR. BURMESTER:

You don't want anymore

examination?

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. BURMESTER:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. KURUMADA:

That's fine.

24

THE COURT:

Mr. Kurumada, I think he's

25

(Inaudible).
Okay.

I don't think so, I mean

—

—

frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind, the work
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